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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the court by §78-2a~3(j), 
U.C.A. This appeal is from a final order, dated October 4, 
1989, of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, 
State of Utah striking motions to enforce, set aside or 
reform a stipulation and judgment. Notice of appeal was 
filed October 26, 1989. On February 27, 1990, this case was 
transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
POINT I 
CHIPMAN'S MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE OR TO REFORM THE 
STIPULATION AND JUDGMENT WERE PROPERLY FILED UNDER RULE 
60(b)(5),(6) OR (7) AND WERE FILED WITHIN A REASONABLE 
TIME. 
POINT II 
RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT IS ALSO AVAILABLE UNDER RULE 60(a) 
"AT ANY TIME." 
POINT III 
THE COURT HAS INHERENT POWER TO SET ASIDE OR REFORM THE 
JUDGMENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ADMINISTERING JUSTICE. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Because the lower court concluded it did not have 
jurisdiction to consider the motions filed, the facts on 
which those motions are based must be taken as true and 
there is no dispute of facts. The issues involved present 
only questions of interpretation of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and, perhaps, of documents alleged to constitute 
-iv-
Statutes and Rules to be Interpreted 
CONTINUED: 
an agreement between the parties. These are questions of 
law. This court is to review the lower court's decision 
only for correctness, without according any deference 
thereto. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989); Madsen 
v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988); Asay v. Watkins. 751 
P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988); Neilson v. Neilson. 780 P.2d 1264 
(Utah App. 1989). 
STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED 
Utah Code Annotated 
§25-5-3 Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than 
one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in 
lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by 
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent 
thereunto authorized in writing. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 1. General provisions. 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the 
procedure in the Supreme Court, the district courts, the 
circuit courts, and the justice courts of the state of Utah 
in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, 
whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in all special 
statutory proceedings, except as governed by other rules 
promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legislature and 
except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally 
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, 
orders or other parts of the record and errors therein 
arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the 
court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court 
orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may 
be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the 
appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
-v-
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(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any 
cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the 
defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the 
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it 
is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or 
(4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken* A motion under this 
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment 
or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to 
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be 
by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action. 
-vi-
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiffs Dennis J* and Suesann Richins (hereinafter 
referred to as "Richins") filed a complaint alleging that a 
verbal sale and lease agreement had been entered into between 
Richins and Defendant Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., Inc. 
(hereinafter referred to as "Chipman"). At trial, after 
Richins presented their evidence and rested their case, a 
stipulation was read into the record by Richins1 attorney. 
That stipulation, and the written stipulation and judgment 
1 
which followed it, were inconsistent, ambiguous and incomplete 
as well as unfair to Chipman to the point of unconscionability 
and the stipulation was not explained to, understood by, nor 
agreed to by Chipman. Chipman filed alternative motions to 
enforce termination of this stipulation for default, to set 
aside the stipulation because the minds of the parties had not 
met and the stipulation was incomplete, unconscionable and 
unenforceable, or to reform the stipulation to eliminate 
ambiguities and unconscionability. Richins filed a motion to 
strike Chipmanfs motion for lack of jurisdiction. 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
The lower court granted Richins1 motion to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that Chipman's motions 
were not filed within three months of the date of the judgment 
as required by Rule 60(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This appeal from that order was filed because Chipman believes 
its motions fall within Rules 60(b) (5) , (6) or (7) , Rule 60(a) 
or is otherwise outside the three-months restriction of Rule 
60(b)(1). 
Statement of Facts 
On or about October 30, 1986, Dennis J. Richins and D. 
Ray Chipman met in the office of James R. Brown, Richins1 
attorney, to discuss the sale of some grazing permits and the 
lease of some property from Chipman to Richins. Chipman 
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verbally agreed to sell one grazing permit and to lease for 
one year other property held by his corporation ("Chipman") 
(R.75-6, 51; 222, 516). Richins was to pay $40,000.00 for the 
permit and $3,000.00 towards the lease that day (Exh. #7, 
R.ll, lines 14-18) and Mr. Brown was to prepare a written 
agreement to be signed by the parties later. Although Mr. 
Brown eventually prepared an agreement (R.7-18), it did not 
reflect the actual agreement of the parties and it was never 
signed by the parties and, incidentally, never offered in 
evidence at the trial. On May 6, 1987, Richins filed a 
complaint asserting that he had an agreement for the sale of 
four grazing permits and a ten-year lease on other property 
held by Chipman and attached the unsigned agreement as 
evidence of that agreement (R.l-19). Chipman filed an Answer 
and Counterclaim denying that anything other than a sale of 
one permit and a one-year lease had been agreed upon and 
seeking a judgment for the remaining $45,000.00 due on the 
one-year lease (R.74-76). 
At the trial on December 21, 1987, Richins presented his 
evidence and rested his case (R.604). No evidence was 
presented to the court by Chipman or Porters, the other 
defendants. After a recess, a stipulation was stated to the 
court by Richins1 attorney (R.504-515). That stipulation was 
not explained to, understood by, nor agreed to by Chipman 
(R.219, 553, 4 & 5) . In fact, he expressly told the court 
that he did not understand it (R.512, lines 10-15) . A written 
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Stipulation for Settlement and Judgment was signed by the 
attorneys for the parties and filed on January 6, 1988 (R.202-
206) and a Judgment signed by the court the same day (R.207-
209) . Both the Stipulation and the Judgment refer to Exhibits 
MAfl which were not attached. Those exhibits were supposedly 
the agreement between the parties. 
Chipman was not effectively represented by its attorney 
because it is believed he was under the influence of alcohol 
during the proceedings on December 21, 1987 (R. 220-1, ^ 8 & 10; 
R. 296-7, 55) • That fact becomes evident when the consequences 
of the stipulation are compared to the total damages sought by 
Richins. The total damages claimed by Richins, without regard 
to the believability of his evidence and countervailing 
evidence which would have been presented by Chipman, was 
$130,643.00 (Exh.18). That would have been the maximum loss 
Chipman would have suffered if it had presented no evidence at 
all and the court had believed Richins1 evidence in full* The 
stipulation stated to the court, the Stipulation for 
Settlement and Judgment, and the Judgment itself are 
inconsistent, ambiguous, confusing (in many particulars) and 
incomplete (in that the real property involved is not 
adequately described) but when the amounts to be paid to 
Chipman thereunder are totaled up, they reduce the amount to 
be paid to Chipman under the agreement which Richins asserted 
was the agreement between the parties (R.7-18) by a minimum of 
$219,680.00 and a maximum of $281,330.00. This is a minimum 
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of $89,037.00 and a maximum of $150,687.00 more than the 
$130,643.00 in damages claimed by Richins. They also commit 
Chipmanfs property to Richins for ten years. 
The stipulation provided that Richins would pay to 
Chipman $15,700.00 on April 15 and December 15 of 1988 and 
each year thereafter, with a possible deduction of $5,765.00 
from each installment. None of those installments have been 
paid by Richins to Chipman (R.223, 521). 
Mr. Chipman attempted several times following the trial 
to get an explanation from his attorney as to what had 
happened and what could be done to get the property back or to 
get Richins to pay for the use of it. No explanation was 
given to him and each time he was told that nothing could be 
done about it (R.221, 59). He then contacted, in turn, 
several attorneys in Utah County. Each took some time to 
review the file but then advised Mr. Chipman that they could 
not help him because of their relationship with his former 
attorney (R.221, 5511 & 12). He then contacted some attorneys 
in Salt Lake County who also took some time to review the file 
and then advised him that they could not help him because of 
their relationship with Richins1 attorney. He contacted 
another attorney who referred him to Chipmanfs present 
attorney who agreed to discuss the matter with him. However, 
because he was in the middle of a trial, he couldn't give it 
his immediate attention. This process of having several 
attorneys review the matter and finally locating an attorney 
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who would represent Chipman took several months (R.222, 5513-
15) • 
Chipman fs new attorney first sent a letter to Richins and 
his attorney. After writing two more letters and receiving no 
satisfactory explanation and a refusal to pay any more money 
(R.229, 552-8), Chipmanfs attorney filed alternative motions 
to enforce termination of the stipulation and judgment for 
default by Richins, to set aside the stipulation for lack of 
agreement and completeness and for unconscionability and 
unenforceability, or to reform the stipulation to eliminate 
ambiguities and unconscionability (R.214-216). These motions 
were supported by affidavits (R.218-237) and a memorandum of 
law with exhibits (R.241-300). There were numerous opposing 
memoranda, counter affidavits, motions to strike affidavits, 
and reply memoranda filed (R.301-446) but the essence of 
Richins opposition was that Chipman vs alternative motions were 
untimely under Rule 60(b). On June 8, 1989, the lower court 
granted Richins1 Motion to Strike the motions filed by Chipman 
but the order granting that motion was not filed until October 
4, 1989 (R.451). This appeal was filed on October 30, 1989. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. RULES 60(B)(5),(6) AND (7) PROVIDE THE COURT WITH 
AUTHORITY TO CONSIDER MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE OR REFORM A 
JUDGMENT FILED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME. 
The judgment in this case was based on a supposed 
stipulation between the parties. Chipman did not consent to 
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it nor understand it and cannot be considered to have agreed 
to it. He was not effectively represented at the trial nor 
during negotiations for the stipulation. The stipulation is 
supposedly contained in several different documents the terms 
of which are inconsistent, confusing, ambiguous and 
incomplete, showing that the minds of the parties did not meet 
and that there is no understandable or enforceable agreement 
between the parties. Furthermore, the stipulation is so 
unconscionable that no court would enforce it. The 
stipulation and the resulting judgment are, therefore, void 
and within the terms of Rule 60(b)(5). 
Because the stipulation reaches nine years into the 
future and the inequity of it came to light after the 
judgment, it is no longer equitable that the judgment have 
prospective application. Rule 60(b)(6), therefore, also 
applies. The ineffective representation of counsel, as can be 
seen from a review of the trial transcript or of the 
affidavits regarding his conduct, but most convincingly from 
a review of the stipulation itself, which no attorney would 
have allowed his client to enter, also brings this case within 
Rule 60(b)(7) as any other reason justifying relief. 
Chipman acted reasonably in attempting to get legal 
assistance to resolve its problems and acted quickly when the 
full implications of the stipulation were discovered. The 
motions to set aside or reform the stipulation and judgment 
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were filed within a reasonable time and were, therefore, 
timely under Rules 60(b)(5),(6) and (7). 
II. RULE 60(A) FURTHER PROVIDES THE COURT WITH AUTHORITY TO 
CORRECT THE OVERSIGHTS AND OMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES AND THE 
COURT AT ANY TIME. 
The judgment in this case does not reflect what the court 
or the parties understood or intended. This conclusion is 
reflected in the comments the court made as it discussed the 
apparent inequities of the judgment. Rule 60(a) allows the 
court to correct more than clerical errors. It grants 
authority to alter or set aside any judgment which does not 
reflect what was intended by the court and the parties. There 
is no time limit placed on motions of this kind and such 
matters can be corrected on the court's own motion when they 
are brought to the court's attention. 
III. THE COURT HAS INHERENT POWER, OUTSIDE THE RULES, TO SET 
ASIDE OR REFORM A JUDGMENT IN ORDER TO ADMINISTER JUSTICE. 
The decided cases hold that the court has inherent power 
to set aside or reform formal orders in order to administer 
justice. When inequity in court orders is demonstrated, the 
courts are not required to sit back and allow their orders to 
work injustice. They have the power to alter or set aside 
those orders whenever that injustice becomes apparent to them. 
This power exists separate and apart from the rules of 
procedure, but is also implicit in those rules which are to be 
liberally construed to secure the just determination of every 
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action. That inherent power is available to grant the relief 
requested in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CHIPMAN'S MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE OR TO REFORM THE 
STIPULATION AND JUDGMENT WERE PROPERLY FILED UNDER 
RULES 60(b)(5),(6) OR (7) AND WERE FILED WITHIN A 
REASONABLE TIME. 
The pertinent portions of Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., provide 
as follows: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order,, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; ... (5) the judgment is void; 
(6) the judgment had been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it 
is no longer equitable that the judgment should 
have prospective application; or (7) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or 
(4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken." 
Richins has contended that the basis of Chipman's motions 
was a mistake in entering the stipulation and that, because 
the motions were not filed within three months of the entry of 
judgment, they were untimely. That contention misses the 
entire point of Chipman's motions, chipman did not enter into 
any agreement at all. Mr. Chipman did not understand what 
Richins was trying to impose upon him and his corporation. He 
did not agree to anything. His lack of understanding was not 
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a mistake but it shows that no agreement was entered into and 
further supports the claim that Chipman was not effectively 
represented. The resulting ambiguity, inconsistency, 
incompleteness, and unconscionability of the stipulation show 
that the minds of the parties had not met and that the 
stipulation is unenforceable and void. A motion based on 
these grounds falls within Rules 60(b)(5), (6) or (7) and may, 
therefore, be filed within a reasonable time and is not 
required to be filed within three months. In order to provide 
the full background to clearly establish these grounds, a 
separate discussion of each element will be presented. 
A. CHIPMAN DID NOT CONSENT TO THE STIPULATION AND 
DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE STIPULATION AND CANNOT BE 
CONSIDERED TO HAVE AGREED TO IT. 
A reading of the transcript of the Stipulation in court 
on December 21, 1987 (R.504-516) shows that Mr. Chipman did 
not consent to the Stipulation as it had been presented. 
After the Stipulation had been presented, Mr. Chipman was 
asked if he had listened to the Stipulation, his response was, 
"What Stipulation?" When told it was the Stipulation Mr. 
Brown just stated into the record he said, "Well, I don't 
understand it." When nudged by his attorney and further 
prodded by the statement, "Well, have you been in here and you 
understand it?" he answered, "I have been in here a long time 
and I don't quite understand it but I guess it is all right." 
(R.512) During the presentation of the Stipulation by Mr. 
Brown, Mr. Chipman asked if he could say something, indicating 
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his lack of approval or of understanding of what had been 
presented, but was not allowed to speak (R.509). 
This limited conversation hardly indicates an approval of 
the terms of the Stipulation but it clearly shows that Mr. 
Chipman did not understand it. Without an understanding of 
it, he could not effectively have approved it. Further, 
nowhere in the Stipulation transcript is there a statement by 
Mr. Chipman's attorney that he approved or agreed to the 
Stipulation and he was not asked for his approval as were all 
of the other parties and attorneys. There simply is no clear 
statement by Mr. Chipman or his attorney that the Stipulation 
was approved. 
Mr. Chipman's lack of understanding of the terms of the 
Stipulation is not surprising in light of the many ambiguities 
and inconsistencies which are discussed in Point IC below, nor 
is it surprising that he would not agree to the Stipulation in 
light of the one-sided and unfair nature of it as discussed in 
Point ID below. 
The courts of this state have held that "parties are 
bound by their stipulations unless relieved therefrom by the 
court, which has the power to set aside a stipulation entered 
into inadvertently or for justifiable cause." First of Denver 
Mortgage Investors v. Zundel. 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979) at 527.* 
A stipulation in court to settle a case is just like any other 
contract in that it requires a meeting of the minds of the 
parties before it is effective. "[T]he same rules apply to 
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binding parties to such an agreement [a stipulation in court] 
as apply to any other agreement." Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 
472 (Utah 1975) at 476. That case is very similar to this 
case in that an oral stipulation was read into the record and 
the plaintiff stated that he did not understand it but relied 
on his attorney. The court there stated that "the issue as to 
whether plaintiff agreed to and should be bound by the 
stipulation was one of fact for the trial court to determine." 
In Klein the trial court did not set aside the stipulation in 
part at least because the stipulation was found to be more 
favorable to the plaintiff than the prior order by some 
$200,000.00. There was, therefore, no justifiable cause to 
set it aside. Here, as will be seen from Point ID below, 
there is justifiable cause to set aside the Stipulation 
because Chipman is worse off by somewhere between $89,000.00 
and $150,000.00 than if the trial had been completed and all 
issues found against Chipman. 
Chipman should not be bound by a stipulation to which it 
has not consented and which it did not understand. 
B. CHIPMAN WAS NOT EFFECTIVELY REPRESENTED BY 
COUNSEL AND IS ENTITLED TO BE RELIEVED FROM THE 
STIPULATIONS AND JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST IT WHILE 
IT WAS WITHOUT EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION. 
An essential factor in the adversarial system of justice 
in this country is that each party to a dispute be effectively 
represented by a competent advocate who will present his 
client's side of the case clearly and aggressively and protect 
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his client's interest both in court and in negotiations with 
opposing parties. When a party is prevented from having his 
position heard and considered or is saddled with an unfair and 
harsh stipulation or judgment as a result of ineffective 
representation by his attorney, the rules of equity allow that 
party to be relieved therefrom. In a case in which the 
plaintiff's complaint was dismissed for failure of the 
plaintiff's attorney to respond to discovery requests and in 
which the plaintiff himself had no knowledge thereof until 
several months later when he employed other counsel, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the "provisions of Rule 60(b)(7) are 
sufficiently broad to permit the court to set aside its former 
order . . . ." Stewart v. Sullivan. 29 U.2d 156, 506 P. 2d 74 
(1973) . 
The Supreme Court had earlier held that a trial court 
"may exercise wide judicial discretion in weighing the factors 
of fairness" in relieving a party from a harsh judgment. 
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.. 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953). 
That language was repeated in Ney v. Harrison, 5 U. 2d 217, 299 
P. 2d 1114 (1956) , in holding that Rule 60(b) (7) , Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, was intended to govern cases where equity and 
fairness dictate that a party should be relieved from the 
effects of a judgment entered against an unrepresented party 
who mistakenly believed she was protected. Her motion for 
relief was filed 11 months after the judgment. 
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In this case, Chipman has presented facts which, if true, 
would clearly indicate it was not effectively represented by 
counsel. If, in fact, counsel for Chipman was under the 
influence of alcohol during the trial and negotiations for a 
stipulation, Chipman was not effectively represented. All of 
the facts reicited in paragraph 8 of the Chipman Affidavit 
(R.220-221) and paragraph 5 of the Osguthorpe Affidavit 
(R.226-227) are consistent with that conclusion and would 
suggest that Chipman ought to be relieved from the Stipulation 
and resulting judgment. However, this brief will not dwell on 
those facts, which speak for themselves, but rather on the 
terms of the Stipulation and Judgment, which are so ambiguous, 
inconsistent, incomplete, unfair and unconscionable that no 
attorney acting in the interests of Chipman could or would 
have approved them. These matters are discussed in detail in 
Points IC and ID below, which are asserted as separate grounds 
for setting aside the Stipulation and Judgment. They are 
incorporated herein by reference as clear and convincing 
evidence of the fact that Chipman was not effectively 
represented and should be granted relief from the Stipulation 
and Judgment entered as a result of that ineffective 
representation, under Rule 60(b)(7). 
C. THE TERMS OF THE STIPULATION, STIPULATION FOR 
SETTLEMENT AND JUDGMENT, AND JUDGMENT ARE SO 
AMBIGUOUS, INCONSISTENT, UNCLEAR, CONFUSING, AND 
INCOMPLETE AS TO SHOW THAT THE MINDS OF THE PARTIES 
HAVE NOT MET WITH RESPECT TO THE TERMS THEREOF AND 
AS TO BE UNENFORCEABLE AND VOID. 
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It has already been pointed out above that a stipulation 
^n c o u r t j^ s j u s t li^e any other agreement and if "there is any 
justification in law or equity for avoiding or repudiating a 
stipulation, . [a party] is entitled to be relieved from 
i t . c . " Klein v. Klein, £*: . ••> 1975) at 476, 
An agreement which is so ambiguous, inconsistent, unclear and 
confusing as to demonstrate that the minds of the parties have 
not met i s no agreement at al ] and cannot be enforced by the 
parties. Pinaree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P. 2d 
1317 (Utah 1976), wherein the following is quoted from 
Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 U.2d 61, 362 P.2d 427 (1961): 
"A condition precedent to the enforcement of any 
contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of 
the parties, which must be spelled out, either 
expressly or impliedly, with sufficient 
definiteness to be enforced." 
With respect to the enforceability of the contract, it is 
stated i JI 4 9 Mi • II ur, Specific Performance, §22, at page 35: 
"The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness, 
and ambiguity, so as to leave nothing to conjecture 
or to be supplied by the court. It must be 
sufficiently certain and definite in its terms to 
leave no reasonable doubt as to what the parties 
intended, and no reasonable doubt of the specific 
thing equity is called upon to have performed, and 
it must be sufficiently certain as to its terms so 
that the court may enforce it as actually made by 
the parties." 
With these principles in mind, let's examine some of the 
terms of the stipulation which it is claimed the parties 
agreed to in this case. The "stipulation" is contained in 
several documents: the stipulation in court (Stipulation 
Transcript) (R.514-16), the Stipulation for Settlement (R.202-
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206 and 278-282), the Sale and Lease Agreement (R.283-294) 
which was unsigned and not attached to the Stipulation for 
Settlement, and a revised Sale and Lease Agreement (R.318-329) 
which neither Chipman nor his attorney have ever seen and 
which was not attached to the Stipulation for Settlement and 
did not even appear in the file until after Chipmanfs motions 
were filed, 
1. There is a reduction in the semi-annual lease 
payments from $24,000•00 to $21,500.00 (R.507, line 19) for 
the last nine (9) years of the lease, or a total reduction of 
$45,000.00. Yet, later the reduction is stated to be 
$40,000.00 (R.509,line 2). In addition, the Stipulation for 
Settlement and Judgment filed January 6, 1988 provides in 
f8.c. (R.281) that, if the first option is not exercised, 
additional offsets of $20,000.00 would be taken against the 
April 1990 and December 1990 payments. It is not clear that 
this is one offset of $20,000.00 or two offsets totalling 
$4 0,000.00. In either event, when added to the four (4) years 
of $2,500.00 semi-annual offsets totalling $20,000.00 to that 
point in time*, the total offset would be either $40,000.00 or 
$60,000.00, both of which are inconsistent with the $45,000.00 
offset stated at page 4 (R.507), line 19 of the Stipulation 
Transcript. A similar ambiguity appears in f8.d. of the 
Stipulation for Settlement and Judgment (R.281) which provides 
that, if the second option is not exercised, additional 
offsets of $10,000.00 would be taken from the April 1993 and 
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December 1992 payments. Again, it is not clear whether this 
is one offset ui $10,000.00 or two offsets totalling 
$20,000.00. In;r in either event, when added to the seven (7) 
years of $2,50C» \ semi-annual offsets totalling $35,000.00 to 
that poi nt . - *, t h*-1 f ota I • of f set woi i] d be either 
$45,000,00 or $55,000.00, both of which are inconsistent with 
the terms of f'8.c and one of which is inconsistent with the 
$45,000 00 offset stated at page 4 (R. 507), line 19 of the 
Stipulation Transcript. 
2 Further ambiguities appear in 558.c. and 8.d. (R.281) 
of the Stipulation for Settlement wherein it is stated that 
offsets will be taken from the 1990 installments if the option 
to renew' :i s not exercised but the opti on Itself does not 
expire until November 1, 1991 (Sale and Lease Agreement, 52.4, 
R.286) and wherein it is stated that offsets will be taken 
from the April 1993 and December 1992 installments if the 
second option to renew is not exercised but the second option 
does not expire until November 1, 1994 (R.2 87, 52.5) . How can 
offsets be taken against installments due before the option 
exercise dates when those offsets are determined by whether or 
i io1. the jpt ions .-.ire exercised? 
3. There is a minor ambiguity on page 5 (R.508) , line 8, 
of the Stipulation Transcript which provides for a reduction 
in payments to Chipman of $11,520.00 per year or $5,765.00 per 
semi-annual payment. The semi-annual reduction should be 
$5,760.00, However, this minor ambiguity i * ^r^:a^e^ */hen it 
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is stated on page 5 (R.508), line 6, of the Stipulation 
Transcript that this reduction "would be done on a semi-annual 
payment basis," that is, $5,760.00 from each semi-annual 
installment, yet page 7 (R.570), lines 13-16, of the 
Stipulation Transcript, which does not appear to be part of 
the Stipulation but just a statement "for the record" (R.570, 
line 7), states that $11,520.00 will be deducted from the 
April 1988 payment. These reductions should be taken either 
annually or semi-annually but not both and not at the Richins1 
option. These provisions are clearly ambiguous. 
4. Further problems arise with this "Pine Hollow" 
reduction of $11,520.00 per year or $5,760.00 per semi-annual 
installment since the Stipulation does not state how many 
years or installments will be affected by this reduction. The 
price to be paid for the Pine Hollow permit was $3 0,000.00 
(Sale and Lease Agreement, R.284, ^1.5:a). If these 
reductions are taken for only three (3) years, Richins will 
have received credit for more than he agreed to pay for that 
permit. And, if these reductions continue for the full term 
of the Lease, the credits to Richins will be both ludicrous 
and unconscionable in amount. The ambiguous nature of this 
provision clearly shows that the minds of the parties did not 
meet. This becomes more obvious when it is realized that the 
Pine Hollow permit was part of the sale portion of the Sale 
and Lease Agreement (R.284, 51.4) and had nothing to do with 
the Lease portion of that agreement. Why should the lease 
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payments on other ground be reduced because of the loss of the 
Pine Hollow permit? A reduction in the purchase price for 
this permit might make sense or a reduction related to the 
loss of the use of tins permit for one year might be 
understandable, Hut !i possible reduction every year for the 
full term of the J ease makes no sense at all and only shows 
how obvious it is that the parties did not and could not have 
agreed t :> tl lis provisi 01 i 
5. The stipulation to pay $15,700.00 to Chipman from the 
funds deposited Ii 1 coi lr t (R. 510, l me 3 , Stipulation 
Transcript) reflects reductions in the $24,000.00 installment 
due under the Sale and Lease Agreement on December 15, 1987 
(R 285, 5[2.3:b.2.) of $8,300.00 will ch is apparently made up of 
$4,000.00 paid to the Porters, $2,500.00 as the first 
installment of the offset damages, and $1,800.00 to be paid by 
Richins directly to Deer Creek Land & Livestock (R,506, line 
22 and R.507, line 3, Stipulation Transcript). Since no 
payment was due Deer Creek Land & Livestock until May of 1988, 
this reduction in December of 1987 is unexplained and creates 
another ambiguity or confusion. 
6. The -: -pulation Transcript at R.508, line 11, 
provides for payments without interest to the Porters until 
April, 1990 whereas the Stipulation for Settlement and 
Judgment (R,2 79) provides in <n,h, for interest and for 
payments only to December 15, 1989. Again, we have 
irreconci1ab] e ambIgu111es. 
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7. The Stipulation for Settlement further provides in 
paragraph 4 (R.279) that Chipman is to have until December 15, 
1989 to transfer the Pine Hollow permit whereas there is no 
such limitation in the Stipulation Transcript. It should be 
kept in mind that Mr. Chipman did not see the Stipulation for 
Settlement and had no opportunity to agree to the terms 
thereof. Therefore, besides not having consented to the court 
stipulation itself, Mr. Chipman had no opportunity to agree to 
any changes thereto or clarifications thereof that may be 
contained in the Stipulation for Settlement or in any other 
document. 
8. Paragraph 5 of the Stipulation for Settlement further 
provides for an $11,520.00 annual reduction in payments for 
the Pine Hollow permit "under the provisions of paragraph 2.8 
of the Agreement", apparently referring to the Sale and Lease 
Agreement. However, paragraph 2.8 of the Sale and Lease 
Agreement (R.288) only applies to loss of leased ground and 
has nothing to do with the permits which were sold. This only 
reinforces the argument that the cost of a lost permit should 
not be offset against lease payments since there is no 
relationship between the two. Again, ambiguity, 
inconsistency, and confusion are the governing principles of 
the stipulations. 
9. Paragraph 5 of the Stipulation for Settlement (R. 
279-280) also provides for a partial reduction for loss of the 
Pine Hollow permit "at the rate of $9.60 per head that the 
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quota is reduced." This also is not part of the in-court 
stipulation. There is no explanation as to the source of this 
figure but, after review of the documents; appears that 
this figure is the amount obtained by dividing $48,000.00 (the 
. in in nidi 1 lease payment riup under the sale and Lease Agreement, 
12.3.b-e) by 5,000 (the number of sheep that Richins claimed 
were to be grazed on all of the Chipman property) . The annual 
reduction of $13 , 52 0 . 00 appear s to be the ainoi int. obtai ned by 
multiplying this $9.60 per head by 1200 (the number of sheep 
allowed to be grazed on the Pine Hollow permit)(R.295). Why 
the loss of one permit which was used for only three (3) 
months of the year (see Term Grazing Permit, R.295) should 
reduce the lease payment as if the loss of use was year round 
is incomprehensible. At most the reduction should have been 
only one-fourth of $11,520.00 or $2,880.00 per year. Again, 
we have reinforcemei it of tl: le argumei it that the cost of a lost 
permit should not be offset against lease payments on other 
.ground especially when the lost permit was usable only three 
(3) months a year and the lease payments cover the ground that 
was usable the other nine (9) months of the year. There is no 
relationship and the ambiguity caused by relating the two in 
the stipulations further emphasizes the fact that the minds of 
the parties have not met. 
10. There are fi irther indications that the minds of the 
parties did not meet arising from the failure of the Richins 
to pay to Chipman even the semi-annual installments set forth 
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in the Stipulation, claiming further reductions not appearing 
anywhere in the stipulations. But the foregoing recitation 
should be sufficient to demonstrate (1) that the stipulations 
are so ambiguous, inconsistent, and confusing as not to be 
capable of being understood by anybody; (2) that the terms of 
the stipulations are not sufficiently definite to be enforced; 
(3) that Mr. Chipman was not effectively represented in the 
negotiations for, and agreement to, such stipulations; and (4) 
that Mr. Chipman could not have understood, let alone 
consented to, the stipulations. These stipulations lack the 
certainty required of enforceable contracts and cannot, 
therefore, be enforced. Pitcher v. Lauritzen. 18 U.2d 3 68, 
423 P.2d 491 (1967) at 493. 
11. The most serious defect in the stipulations and the 
judgment is the fact that the property which is supposedly 
subject to the stipulations and the judgment is nowhere 
described or identified sufficiently to satisfy the statute of 
frauds. This same defect was also present in the original 
agreement which Richins alleged to have made with Chipman, 
demonstrating that Richins were not entitled to the relief 
sought in this suit. However, that defect was carried over 
into the stipulations and judgment and makes them also 
unenforceable. The applicable statute is §25-5-3, U.C.Ac, 
which provides as follows: 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period 
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or 
any interest in lands, shall be void unless the 
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
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writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease 
or sale is to be made or by his lawful agent 
thereunto authorized in writing. 
In holding a contract void which did not include the 
legal descriptions of the property to be sold, the Utah Court 
of Appeals, in Vasels v. LoGuidice, 7 40 P 2d 1375 (I Jtah Ct. 
App. 1987), quoted the above statute and then stated: 
"It is fundamental that the memorandum which is 
relied upon to satisfy the statute of frauds must 
contain all the essential terms and provisions of 
the contract." Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 
121 Utah 412, 416, 242 P.2d 578, 580 (1952). The 
identity of the property to be sold is 
unquestionably an essential term of an enforceable 
land sales contract. See e.g., Barnard v. Barnard, 
700 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1985); Davison v. Robbins, 30 
Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973); Pitcher v. 
Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967). 
The results in these cases flow naturally from the 
basic principle that the mutual assent of the 
parties is essential to create a binding contract. 
Bunnell v. Bills. 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P. 2d 597 
(1962); E.B. Wicks Co. v. Moyle, 103 Utah 554, 137 
P.2d 342 (1943). . . . Here, as in Davison, the 
parties1 written agreement shows undisputably that 
the requisite meeting of the minds on this 
essential term did not take place. Thus, no 
contract was formed, and the buyers were entitled 
to the return of their payment. The trial judgment 
correctly ruled that the document was not a 
contract that could be enforced under our statute. 
Since the :;l i puJ at n »ns and judgment .ire mot only a sale 
but a lease of real property for more than one year, they are 
clearly subject to the statute of frauds. Mr. Chipman was not 
aware that his properties were being leased for ten years 
(R.220, 57(f)). Furthermore, it is irrelevant what he or any 
other party thought. I f the property invo 1 ved. I s not 
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sufficiently described, the stipulations and judgment, like 
any contract, are void and unenforceable, 
D. THE TERMS OF THE STIPULATION, STIPULATION FOR 
SETTLEMENT AND JUDGMENT, AND JUDGMENT ARE SO UNFAIR 
AND INEQUITABLE AS TO BE UNCONSCIONABLE AND, 
THEREFORE, UNENFORCEABLE. 
To understand how unfair the stipulations are, it must be 
remembered that Richins was claiming a total of $130,643.00 
damages from Chipman (see Trial Exhibit 18 which is at R.296). 
At the time of the Stipulation in court, Richins had put on 
his entire case and had rested. A review of the trial 
transcript shows that Richins had not proved the existence of 
a contract with Chipman as claimed, had failed to prove he had 
actually suffered the damages claimed, and had failed to prove 
that such damages had been caused by any breach of a contract 
by Chipman. All of the claimed damages could be attributed to 
Richins1 own management methods, the weather, or other causes. 
Chipman had not yet been allowed to put on its evidence which 
might have required the court to dismiss Richins1 claims 
entirely but surely would have reduced those claims to some 
degree. Under such circumstances, a compromise and settlement 
would normally result in an agreement to pay Richins some 
fraction of the $130,643.00 he was claiming. Yet, as near as 
can be determined from the stipulations and from the Richins' 
interpretation of them, as expressed by actual payments made 
(or rather not made), Chipman has lost a total of between 
$219,680.00 and $281,330.00. What kind of a compromise and 
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settlement is that? Assuming the worst, that the court 
accepted Richins1 claims in full dinini rejected a LI evidence 
offered by Chipman, Chipman would have lost only $130,643.00. 
The "compromise" results :i n a 1 oss of" $219,680.00 to 
$281 , 330 00 ! The i nequ i t. y in tha t si >eaks for i tself 
These "compromise" losses to Chipman are calculated as 
follows: 
The stipulations reduce the amounts to be received by 
Chipman as follows: 
November 30, 1986 
Lease Payment $ 21,000.00 
18 payment reductions or 
$2,500.00 each 45,000.00 
Pine Hollow Reductions of 
$11,520.00 x 9 years 103,680.00 
Elimina11oi I c >f ] 1 -15-8 9 
Payment 3 0,000.00 
Payments to Porters 20,000.00 
Sub-Total: $219,680.00 
In addition, Richins is 
claiming additional reductions of 
$2,500.00 per semi-annual 
installment not apparent in the 
stipulations but deducted from 
the 1988 installments which were 
due but not paid (see R.297) x 
18 = 45,000.00 
Richins is further claiming 
the right to deduct for other 
items without any relationship 
to diminished carrying capacity 
or time of use (see R.299, "Lost 
Church Ground—$750.00") x 
9 years 6,750.00 
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Additional losses may result 
from matters not covered by the 
stipulations because Richins is 
paying increased payments to Deer 
Creek Land and Livestock and 
other parties to whom lease 
payments are due and deducting 
the amounts thereof from 
installments due Chipman without 
increasing the installments due 
Chipman by the increases in those 
underlying payments: 
Deer Creek Payment of 
$3,600.00 less $3,000.00 
included in Chipman Lease 
for Deer Creek = $600.00 x 9 = 5,400.00 
Waldo Corporation Payment of 
$5,000.00 (R.297 & 299) less 
$4,500.00 included in Chipman 
Lease for Waldo = $500.00 x 9 = 4,500.00 
Sub-Total: $ 61,650.00 
TOTAL REDUCTIONS: $281,330.00 
Such a "settlement" makes these stipulations subject to 
the principles stated in Resource Management Co. v. Weston 
Ranch & Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985): 
"Courts will not be parties to enforcing flagrantly 
unjust agreements." (at page 1040) 
An unconscionable contract is one which "no decent, 
fair-minded person would view the ensuing result 
without being possessed of a profound sense of 
injustice." (at page 1041) 
"Historically, a bargain was said to be 
unconscionable if it was *such as no man in his 
senses and not under delusion would make on the one 
hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on 
the other.1" (at page 1040) 
"Substantive unconscionability is indicated by 
*contract terms so one-sided as to oppress or 
unfairly surprise an innocent party.1" (at page 
1040) 
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Factors which are considered in determining 
unconscionability include excessive price, phrasing clauses in 
language that is incomprehensible to a layman, overall 
imbalance in the obligations and rights imposed by the 
barge • • tf opportunity toi meaninqfu1 neqotiat HIH, ind 
whether the aggrieved party was compelled to accept the terms. 
See Resource Management Co. above, at 1042, and Bekins Bar V 
Ranch V. Huth, 6<:>4 I1", 2d 4>:>5 (Utah 1983) at 462. 
If ever there were a case where "no decent, fair-minded 
person would view the ensuing result without being possessed 
of a profound sense of injustice11, this is it. How could a 
maximum possible loss of $130,643.00 be turned into a 
"compromise11 1 oss ut ;i- !<>,680. on to $281,330.00 without 
invoking a profound sense of injustice in decent, fair-minded 
persons? Surely "i10 man in his senses and not under delusion 
would ma ke [and] . . . no honest ai id fa i r man would accept11 
such a bargain. Quite clearly, the excessive price extracted 
from Chipman, the ambiguities and confusion included in 
language incomprehensible both to layman and lawyers, Mr. 
Chipman's lack of opportunity for a meaningful negotiation, 
iind his I'iav i nq b<-»r»n pressured i nto a settl emei it have resulted 
in stipulations with "terms so one-sided as to oppress or 
unfairly surprise an innocent party." This court should not 
lif a pai t y to th<* eniorcement of such a "flagrantly unjust11 
agreement and should set aside the stipulations and judgment. 
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E. IN THE EVENT THE COURT DOES NOT SET ASIDE THE 
STIPULATIONS AND JUDGMENT FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH 
ABOVE, IT SHOULD REFORM THE STIPULATIONS AND 
JUDGMENT TO CONFORM TO THE INTENTIONS OF THE 
PARTIES AND TO MAKE THE STIPULATIONS AND JUDGMENT 
FAIR AND EQUITABLE. 
The above cases establish that "if a contract is 
unconscionable, in whole or in part, the court may, on 
equitable grounds, refuse to enforce the unconscionable 
provisions, or it may construe the contract to avoid an 
unconscionable result." Resource Management Co., above, at 
1040; Bekins Bar V Ranch, above, cit 459; Biesincrer v. Behunin, 
584 P. 2d 801 (Utah 1978) at 803. There is further substantial 
authority for the court to reform a stipulation, if the court 
determines that the minds of the parties had met, but the 
stipulation and/or judgment fail to conform to the intentions 
of the parties or that one party was mistaken as to the actual 
content of the stipulation or judgment and the other party 
knew of the mistake and remained silent or is guilty of fraud 
or other inequitable conduct. Mabey v. Kay Peterson 
Construction Co., Inc., 682 P. 2d 287 (Utah 1984) at 290; 
Thompson v. Smith, 620 P. 2d 520 (Utah 1980) at 523; Kesler v. 
Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975); Jensen v. Manila Corp. of 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 565 P.2d 63 
(Utah 1977); Intermountain Farmers Association v. Peart, 3 0 
U.2d 201, 515 P.2d 614 (1973). Judgments based on 
stipulations are subject to the same rules of construction or 
as to enforcement as all written contracts. Lucky Seven Rodeo 
Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah 1988). 
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The unconscionable results outlined in Point ID above 
req[u:i re t::l: le coi irt ei tl iei: tc se t asj :ie 01 : resci ncl the 
stipulation and judgment or to refuse enforce or to 
construe them so as to avoid the obvious unconscionabilityo 
'Those same uni'nnsc i , v uMo resu] t i:-,, toqether with the 
ambiguities outlined Point IC above and the lack of 
understanding ^±. consent and ineffective representation 
referred to in Points IA and IB above, make it clear that 
Chipman did not and could not have intended what the 
stipulations and judgment apparent] y provide ai id w ha 1: R ich i ns 
claim they provide as shown by his refusal to pay any 1988 
installments (See R-297 & 299). It does not matter whether 
R ich ins takes the positi on that he di .dn ' t iinderstarid, too, and 
did not know these unconscionable results would follow or that 
lie w a s aware of Chipman's lack of understanding and remained 
silent only ater take advantage of him by refusing to pay 
installments that Chipman thought were due. In either case, 
re forma t ion is app r op r i at e i f the s t i pi i ] a t :i o n s and j udgment 
are not set aside or rescinded. 
It must be remembered that Chipman's intent from the 
first was t o s e 11 ] t o R i c h i n s o n e p e r m I t a n d 1 e a s e i t s other 
land for one year at a time. Mr. Chipman agreed to nothing 
more than that and his actions were entirely consistent with 
that intent. He was shocked to find out that the stipulations 
and judgment bound him L an agreement that tied up the 
Chipman ] and for ten (] A > i years. Even at that, he she i i,l d have 
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been able to expect payment in full of the $48,000.00 annual 
lease payments for those ten (10) years. Yet, even though the 
time has passed for the payment of eight (8) semi-annual 
installments of $24,000.00 each, Chipman has only received one 
and part of another. The prospects are that, as the 
stipulation and judgment are interpreted by Richins, Chipman 
will receive very little, if any, of the future installments. 
Again, a total loss to Chipman of $219,680.00 to 
$281,330.00, when its maximum loss if it would have allowed 
Richins to take a default judgment would only have been 
$130,643.00, is unconscionable and could not have been 
understood or intended by Chipman or the court. Reformation, 
if not rescission or setting aside the stipulations and 
judgment, is clearly the duty of the court. In the 
alternative, of course, the stipulations should be terminated 
for nonpayment and Richins ordered to convey to Chipman all 
leases and permits previously assigned or issued to Richins. 
P. RULES 60(b)(5), (6) and (7) ARE APPLICABLE TO 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
With this background demonstrating that the minds of the 
parties did not meet, that Chipman was not effectively 
represented, that the stipulation is void and unenforceable 
for ambiguity, inconsistency, and incompleteness, and also for 
unconscionability, the question of the application of Rules 
60(b)(5), (6) or (7) can be more effectively addressed. 
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Since judgments based on stipulations are subject to the 
same rules of construction or as to enforcement as all written 
contracts, Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp, v. Clark, supra, all of the 
elements discussed above, that is, lack of a meeting of the 
minds, ambiguity, inconsistency, incompleteness and 
unconscionability, that render a contract void, also render 
the judgment based on the stipulation in this case void. 
Therefore, Rule 60(b)(5), allowing a void judgment to be set 
aside, applies in this case. Chipman has simply asked the 
court to examine the various documents which purport to 
contain the stipulation of the parties and determine, if 
possible, the intentions of the parties and if they have 
agreed on the essential elements of a fair and enforceable 
contract. Those documents do not contain those essential 
elements and, therefore, the judgment and the supposed 
stipulation on which it is based are void. The document which 
Richins1 claims constitutes the agreement between the parties 
is not signed by any of the parties (though signature lines 
are provided) (R.318-329) and is not even attached to the 
written Stipulation for Settlement nor to the Judgment (though 
supposedly referred to in both). That document was not even 
in the file in this case until Richins' attorney attached it 
to his response to Chipman's motions. Until then it had not 
been seen by Chipman nor his attorney nor by the court. 
Furthermore, none of the documents, including that one, 
describe the real property that is supposed to be governed by 
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them. That is an essential of any contract for the sale or 
lease of real property. Add to that the unconscionability of 
the stipulation and judgment and the unenforceability of the 
purported stipulation becomes obvious many times over. The 
purported stipulation and the judgment based thereon are void 
and Rule 60(b)(5) clearly applies. 
The stipulation and judgment in this case provide for 
payments to be made for nine years into the future. This 
prospective application of the judgment also means that 
Chipman's motions qualify under Rule 60(b)(6) as a motion to 
relieve a party from a judgment because "it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application." The payments to be made in the future from 
Richins to Chipman are calculated based on semi-annual 
reductions for payments for alleged but unproved damages due 
from Chipman to Richins. These reductions claimed by Richins, 
as has been demonstrated above, were not understood or 
intended by Chipman or the court and result in an 
unconscionable arrangement. These inequities were not 
discovered by Chipman until after the judgment was entered. 
It is, therefore, "no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application" and it is appropriate to 
set aside or modify the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) to 
prevent injustice. That has been the holding of several 
federal cases interpreting the comparable provision of the 
federal rule. Bros. Inc. v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co.. 320 F.2d 594 
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(CA5, 1963); Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carrier Corp., 322 F. 
Supp. 722 (DCNY 1970). 
Reference has already been made to Stewart v. Sullivan 
and Ney v. Harrison, supra, which held motions to set aside 
inequitable judgments resulting from ineffective 
representation to come within Rule 60(b)(7). That principle 
certainly applies here. The obvious inequity in this case, if 
no other ground can be found, is clearly "any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Rule 
60(b)(7). In fact, it would be difficult to find a case with 
more reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The wide discretion implicit in Rule 60(b)(7) was 
designed for such cases and if not applied to them would be 
rendered meaningless. Of the federal counterpart to this 
rule, it has been said that it "vests power in courts adequate 
to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is 
appropriate to accomplish justice." Klapprott v. United 
States, 335 U.S. 601, 615 (1949). This rule is available 
where unusual circumstances have led to a tainted judgment. 
Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 576-578 
fn. 4 (D.C. Cir. 1980). It is submitted that this case 
qualifies for relief under Rule 60(b)(7). 
Motions under Rules 60(b)(5), (6) and (7) are not 
required to be brought within three months but only within a 
reasonable time. What is a reasonable time depends on the 
circumstances. In this case, Chipman was delayed first by the 
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lack of response or action by its original attorney and then 
for many months by the time required for several attorneys, in 
turn, to review the file and reject the case and then for its 
present attorney to read the file, the various transcripts and 
depositions, numerous exhibits and documents involved and to 
study the various documents purporting to contain the 
stipulation of the parties to determine their effect on 
Chipman. When that effect was determined, letters were 
written to Richins and his attorney which eventually led to a 
meeting in which Richins refused to pay any more money and 
confirmed his unconscionable understanding of the stipulation 
(R.228-237). When it thus became obvious that Richins1 
interpretation of the stipulation would cost Chipman from 
$219,680.00 to $281,330.00 when his total "compromise" loss 
should have been less than $130,643.00, he acted immediately. 
The motions were filed within eleven days of the meeting with 
Richins which confirmed the status of the stipulation. He 
acted within a reasonable time even though the motions were 
filed within fourteen months of the judgment. The motion in 
Stewart v. Sullivan, supra, was filed ten months after the 
judgment and in Ney v. Harrison, supra, eleven months after 
the judgment. In both cases, the motion was held to be timely 
and was granted. Likewise, Chipman has acted within a 
reasonable time under the circumstances and is entitled to 
relief under Rules 60(b)(5), (6) or (7). 
34 
POINT II 
RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT IS ALSO AVAILABLE UNDER RULE 
60(a) "AT ANY TIME." 
Rule 60(a), U.R.C.P., provides as follows: 
"Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from 
oversight or omission may be corrected by the court 
at any time of its own initiative or on the motion 
of any party and after such notice, if any, as the 
court orders . . . ." 
It is usually assumed that Rule 60(a) applies only to 
clerical errors but a careful reading of the rule demonstrates 
that it also applies to errors which are not clerical but 
which arise "from oversight or omission." Such errors may be 
corrected "at any time." 
This and other grounds have been the basis for vacating 
an order which does not accurately reflect the result of the 
court's judgment. In Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 U.2d 196, 
299 P.2d 827 (1956), the court stated: 
"It is well established that the court may vacate, 
set aside, or modify its orders or judgments 
entered by mistake or inadvertence which do not 
accurately reflect the result of its judgment. It 
is plainly apparent that the trial court thought he 
was signing an order that Equity Oil release the 
one half of the proceeds of oil production to Stock 
and Juhan which it had been adjudicated previously 
that they were entitled to (the Phebus half), and 
that the judge did not know that they had been 
currently receiving such funds, nor that the effect 
of the order he signed would have been to release 
to them one half of the other half (the Stock half) 
of the funds to which it had been adjudicated that 
they were not entitled. This act did not reflect 
his judgment, and, therefore, does not represent an 
error in judgment on his part. It was a mistake of 
a perfunctory or clerical nature apparently 
resulting from an erroneous assumption that the 
order as prepared by counsel correctly reflected 
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the judgment of this and the lower court. It is 
the type of error the court could and properly did, 
correct upon its own motion. The authority of the 
court to cause its proceedings and its judgments 
and orders to be correctly set forth in its records 
is necessarily inherent in its powers for the 
purpose of administering justice. 
In our case, it was not the court's intention to sign a 
judgment which would result in a loss to Chipman of 
$280,000.00 when the maximum judgment plaintiffs were entitled 
to was $130,000.00. 
This is apparent from the lower court's comments at the 
hearing on May 5, 1989. After learning of the discrepancy 
between the losses to Chipman under the stipulation and the 
damages claimed by Richins, the court stated "this concerns 
me" (R.616, line 16). When the court learned that the losses 
for the Pin€» Hollow permit were nine times the amount shown 
for this loss on Exhibit 18 (R.296), the court stated "that 
doesn't seem appropriate to me" (R.620, line 15). Then, in a 
conversation with Richins' attorney, the court clearly stated 
its disagreement with Richins' claim of damages for nine years 
without mitigating damages and that such a measure of damages 
was "extremely difficult" (R.622, line 9) and not "appropriate 
or fair" (R.621, line 17). 
The judgment, as prepared by Richins' attorney, was 
signed by the court under the erroneous assumption that it 
correctly reflected a stipulation which would not cause a loss 
to Chipman of more than $130,000.00. This was an oversight or 
omission which can be corrected by the court under Rule 60(a) 
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because, as in Meagher v. Equity Oil Co,, supra, the judgment 
as signed did not reflect the judgment or intent of the court. 
POINT III 
THE COURT HAS INHERENT POWER TO SET ASIDE OR REFORM 
THE JUDGMENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ADMINISTERING 
JUSTICE. 
The Meaaher v. Equity Oil Co, case, supra, stated that 
the court has authority that "is necessarily inherent in its 
powers for the purpose of administering justice.11 This 
inherent power was an alternate basis for the decision in 
Dixon v, Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 P.2d 1211 (1952), in which 
the court held that a motion to set aside a judgment that was 
not in compliance with a stipulation of the parties was proper 
and timely even though it was filed more than three months 
after entry of the judgment. The court stated: 
" . . . the formal order of April 3, 1950, was more 
than a mere inadvertence. The record as corrected 
by the inclusion therein of the minute order of 
July 8, 1949, clearly indicates that the signing 
and entering of such formal order was done upon the 
erroneous assumption that it conformed to a 
direction of the court theretofore made after a 
hearing on the merits. In light of the allegations 
of plaintiff's petition requesting that it be set 
aside, it would work upon her a grave injustice to 
permit the order to stand. Under Rule 60(b), 
U.R.C.P., a judgment or order may be set aside for 
any reason other than those specified in reasons 1 
to 6 *justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment1, if motion is made within a reasonable 
time. In view of plaintiff's physical and mental 
condition, we cannot say that application for the 
relief asked was unseasonably made. Furthermore, 
in the absence of a rule to that effect, the court, 
perhaps, had inherent power to set the formal order 
aside." 
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The facts now before the court also fit squarely within 
the holding of that case. The judgment does not comply with 
the stipulation which was clearly not understood nor agreed to 
by Chipman. These circumstances clearly fall within Rule 
60(b)(7) as "any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment" and the court further, in the 
absence of such a rule, has "inherent power to set the formal 
order aside." Dixon, at 1212. 
Furthermore, relief from a judgment is still available 
pursuant to the remedies in use before adoption of Rule 60(b). 
Rule 60(b) is based upon the Federal Rule 60(b) with respect 
to which it has been stated: 
"Since the rules have been in force, decisions have 
been rendered that the use of bills of review, 
coram nobis, or audita querela to obtain relief 
from final judgments is still proper and that 
various remedies of this kind still exist although 
they are not mentioned in the rules and the 
practice is not prescribed in the rules" (Clark 
Bardman, Rules of Civil Procedure for the United 
States District Courts, p. 668)." 
Thus, the time limitations of Rule 60(b) are not 
conclusive of the matters now before the court. So long as 
Chipman has acted within a reasonable time, the court clearly 
has jurisdiction to consider these matters. The injustice and 
unconscionability which are resulting from the judgment 
require that the court take action to relieve defendants from 
the judgment as it now stands. 
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CONCLUSION 
Since the lower court's order was based on its 
determination that it was without jurisdiction to consider 
Chipman's motions because they were filed more than three 
months after the judgment was entered, it is necessary to 
determine if those motions can be considered by the court 
under any rule or authority which is not restricted by the 
three-month limitation of Rules 60(b)(1)-(4). The most 
obvious authority to consider such motions are the provisions 
of Rules 60(b) (5) , (6) and (7) which are not restricted by the 
three-month limitation. Because the stipulation is so 
confusing, ambiguous, incomplete and unconscionable, it is 
clear that the minds of the parties have not met and there is 
no agreement which can be enforced. Besides the numerous 
inconsistencies in the various provisions, the lack of an 
adequate description of the property to satisfy the statute of 
frauds and the unfairness of a "compromise" which penalizes 
Chipman more than double the amount of a default judgment, had 
such been taken, the parties cannot even agree on which 
document constitutes their "agreement." Richins contends the 
agreement is in a document which is unsigned by anybody, 
appears nowhere in the file, and has not been seen by Chipman, 
its attorney, or the court, which is supposed to have approved 
the stipulation. An agreement which does not exist or has 
these other failings and deficiencies is unenforceable and 
void and the judgment on which it is based is likewise void. 
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Rule 60(b)(5), therefore, is clear authority for the 
consideration of Chipman's motions. 
The nature of the alleged stipulation carries its gross 
inequities into the future for nine years. Whatever any of 
the parties may have thought about the stipulation at the 
beginning, the realization, after the fact, that it is 
inequitable and is not what the court or the parties intended, 
makes it clear that it is no longer equitable that the 
resulting judgment have prospective application. Rule 
60(b)(6), therefore, also grants the authority to consider 
Chipman's motions. 
The further question of ineffective representation, 
whether or not it is true, brings this case within Rule 
60(b)(7), according to the decided cases on that point. 
Furthermore, Rule 60(b)(7), by its words alone, was intended 
to provide the basis to justify relief when no other ground 
can be found. The purpose of that rule is to accomplish 
justice and it, along with all of the rules, are to be 
liberally construed for that purpose. Rule 1(a). 
It is perhaps less obvious but a careful reading of Rule 
60(a) shows that the kind of oversight or omission that 
appears in this case may be corrected by the court at any 
time. It is clear from the record that the court did not 
intend, and would not have approved of, the result of the 
stipulation in this case. Rule 60(a) provides the authority 
to grant the relief sought without any time restriction. 
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There is further authority to grant the relief sought in 
this case in the inherent power of the court to set aside or 
reform judgments for the purpose of administering justice as 
well as in the various remedies in use before the adoption of 
Rule 60(b) which have survived that adoption. That inherent 
authority has been used to grant relief in cases very similar 
to this case and should be used again, if necessary, to 
administer justice. 
Injustice has been done in this case. The court has 
sufficient authority both under the rules and within its 
inherent power to do justice to entertain Chipman's motions 
and to grant the relief sought. The lower court was in error 
in concluding that it did not have jurisdiction. That 
decision should be reversed and this case sent back with 
instructions to set aside the stipulation and judgment or to 
reform them to remove the unconscionability and the ambiguity. 
DATED this 16th day of July, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKM&N. CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
********** 
DENNIS J. RICHINS and 
SUESANN RICHINS, 
vs. 
PET BERT CHTIMAN 
D. RAY CHTIMAN, 
RICHARD PORTER, 
and JOHN DOES 1 
Plaintiffs, 
& SONS CO., INC., 
individually, 
KENNEIH PORTER, 
throu^i 10, 
Defendants. 
CRCER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS M3EICN 
TO b-JLKlKE UKFJdOanS CEHiM^' 
CHEEMAN & SCMS. INC. AND D. RAY 
QUIMAN'S MJTICN TO EMFCRCE 
TEBMIMMrrnNr nv TiR S^E H1RSUANT TO 
SmPIAiTICN, IN COURT CR, IN THE 
AITEERNA33VE, TO SET ASIDE CR TO 
REFCBM gEIHJIATICW 
C i v i l No. CV87-1076 
(Judge Boyd L. Park) 
********** 
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendants1 Motions for lack of 
jurisdiction under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure came on 
for hearing before the Honorable Boyd L. Park on the 8th day of June, 
1989. Plaintiffs v/ere present in person and represented by counsel of 
record, James R. Brown, Esq., of Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn. 
Defendants Delbert Chipman & Sons, Inc. and D. Ray Oiipman were present 
and represented by counsel of record, Ralph J. Marsh, Esq., of Backman, 
Clark & Marsh. Defendants Richard Porter and Kenneth Porter were not 
page 2 
present, but were represented by counsel of record, George A. Hunt, Esq., 
of Sncw, Christensen & Martineau. The Court hearing oral argument by the 
respective parties and being fully apprised in the premises and for good 
cause appearing, it is hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Defendants Oiipmans1 
Motions are properly under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and must be brought within three months after the judgment was 
entered. Defendants Oiipmans1 Motions were not filed within the three 
month period and this Court is without jurisdiction to hear the motions. 
It is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED this Order Striking the 
Defendants1 Motions is a final order from which an appeal lies, if any 
party desires to appeal. , 
DATED this .s^E^Tday of-Sepfcaxibes, 1989. 
L. Park 
District Court Judge 
